Miscellaneous MI 40
Before an employer is entitled to either a ruling or a determination, it must be determined that the protest is timely. Time limitations within which the employer must reply are set forth in Section 1030 of the Calif. Unemp. Ins. Code, which provides in part:
" (a) Any employer who is entitled under Section 1327 to receive notice of the filing of a new or additional claim may, within 10 days after mailing of the notice, submit to the department any facts within its possession disclosing whether the claimant left the employer’s employ voluntarily and without good cause or was discharged from the employment for misconduct . . . . The period during which the employer may submit these facts may be extended by the director for good cause.
(b) Any base period employer who is not entitled under Section 1327 to receive notice of the filing of a new or additional claim and is entitled under Section 1329 to receive notice of computation may, within 15 days after mailing of the notice of computation, submit to the department any facts within its possession disclosing whether the claimant left the employer’s employ voluntarily and without good cause or was discharged from the employment for misconduct . . . . The period during which the employer may submit these facts may be extended by the director for good cause."
For example, in P-R-107, the claimant was laid off for lack of work caused by a trade dispute. Since the employer did not consider this a severance of the employer-employee relationship, he did not respond to the Notice of New Claim Filed (DE 1101C). Subsequently, on August 18, the claimant submitted a resignation to the employer. On August 28, a Notice of Claim Filed and Computation of Benefit Amounts (DE 1545) was mailed to the employer. On September 10 the employer protested the claimant’s quit and requested a ruling. The Board held that the employer was not entitled to a determination or ruling because he had not responded to the first claim notice (DE 1101C). In its decision, the Board stated:
" The employer concedes it submitted no information to the Department in response to the notice of new claim filed. Therefore under the provisions of Section 1328 of the code it was not entitled to a notice of determination . . . nor was it entitled under the provisions of Section 1030 and 1032 of the code to a notice of ruling. "
B. Granting Extension of Timeliness
Calif. Unemp Ins. Code, Section 1030, provides that the time limit for requesting a ruling may be extended for good cause.
To establish good cause, the employer must present a substantial reason for the delay. A substantial reason would be a reason that was reasonably beyond the employer’s control. Several examples follow:
- The employer’s protest is dated the last day of the protest period, but the postmark is the following day. Unless there is reason to believe otherwise, it can be assumed that the protest was timely as the post office is not always able to postmark every piece of mail on the same day it is received, especially if it is received with the final rush of mail at the end of a business day.
- The company is small and either the employer or the individual with the required information is ill or out of town. (Normally this would not be good cause for a larger employer who would have more detailed records, or because of the size of the business would provide for someone to assume the duties of the person not available. However, if a large employer gives a reasonable reason for not being able to secure the required information, good cause may be found.)
- If the employer states that the notice was inadvertently lost, and there is no reason to doubt the statement, good cause may be found.
- A trade dispute has disrupted the employer’s normal office operation.
- A natural disaster which limits mail delivery or prevents the employer’s staff from getting to work.
A delayed response to a claim notice, which stems from the employer’s interoffice procedures for transmitting such notices, does not establish good cause for extending the time limit. Such was the finding in P-R-146. In this case, the claimant’s services were performed in the San Bernardino area, under the direction and control of the employer’s West Coast office located in Sacramento. Following the claimant’s discharge, a notice of claim filed was mailed to the Sacramento address. Due to the employer policy of handling all protests in the home office, the notice was remailed to Dayton, Ohio, and information relevant to the claimant’s discharge was ultimately furnished by the employer on an untimely basis.
In appealing the denial of a determination-ruling, the employer contended that the delayed response was partially attributable to departmental action, as they had previously requested that claim notices be mailed to their Dayton office. The Board noted that nothing in the Code or Regulations requires the Department to establish the administratively impossible procedure of mailing notices to any particular office or employing unit, and said:
" . . . If an employer follows a policy, such as this employer follows, to respond to notices of claims from a central location, it is incumbent on the employer to set up a procedure so that notices may be responded to within the time limit provided by law. . . . The employer was late in responding to the notice of claim filed and has not established good cause for extending the period in which to submit information . . . . "
Extension of timeliness is not to be considered in those cases where the employer failed to respond to the first notice, but replied to the second. If, however, the employer contends the first notice was not received, consider whether or not the employer was properly notified.
In those cases where the employer requests a ruling on a base period separation, but does not include the DE 1545, the protest would be considered as timely if postmarked within 38 days after the first benefit payment. If the postmark is after the 38th day, the actual mailing date must be secured from Central Office, Contribution Rate Group (CRG), MIC 4.
C. Granting a New Period of Timeliness
A distinction should be made between situations that require consideration of extending the timeliness period, and those that require determining whether the employer is entitled to a whole new period of timeliness. The following circumstances warrant the issuing of a new protest period:
- The employer fails to file a protest within the statutory time limit because of misinformation from the Department, or other Department error. In such cases, the employer has a new period of protest starting from the date he is given the proper information.
- The notice the employer receives lists the claimant under a name other than the name used while employed by the employer. A new period of timeliness begins on the date the Department provides the correct name to the employer.
- The employer notifies the field office that he submitted a protest which the employer contends was properly addressed and timely mailed. The office has no record of receiving it. If the employer’s explanation appears reasonable, the employer should be requested to submit a duplicate protest along with a signed statement that the original notice was properly addressed and mailed timely. A new period of timeliness begins on the date theDepartment notifies the employer to submit the duplicate protest.
D. Multiple Terminations From the Same Employer
An employer is entitled to a ruling on each of the claimant’s periods of employment until a favorable ruling is received, as long as the employer responded timely to the first claim notice received and specifically protested each termination.
For example, the employer receives a DE 1101 on May 12 for a former employee. The employee was laid off on May 6 due to lack of work. The claimant had also worked for this employer for several months during the base period and quit to seek other employment. Unable to find another job, she returned to work one month after quitting. The employer did not respond to the DE 1101. However, upon receipt of the DE 1545, the employer requested a ruling on the quit that occurred during the base period. The response to the DE 1545 would be considered untimely because the employer did not respond timely to the DE 1101, the first notice received.
E. Multiple Notices
An employer who is the last employer and a base-period employer receives two notices from the Department, a Notice of Claim Filed (DE 1101), and a Notice of Wages Used for Unemployment Insurance (UI) Claim (DE 1545). The employer must respond timely to the first notice in order to be eligible for a ruling. However, a base-period employer is entitled to a part-time ruling if the response to the DE 1545 is timely, even if there was no response to a previous DE 1101.
F. Employer Submits Newly Acquired Eligibility Information
Calif. Unemp. Ins. Code, Sections 1327 and 1328, provide that an employer who acquires eligibility information that could not have been known at the time of receipt of the DE 1101 or DE 1545, must submit such information within ten days of its acquisition in order to be entitled to a determination or determination/ruling.
Such was the finding in P-B-107. The Board held that the employer was not entitled to a determination or ruling on eligibility information submitted more than ten days after the employer acquired knowledge of the facts. In its decision, the Board stated:
" . . . [I]f the employer believed this information would somehow affect the claimant’s eligibility for benefits, it was obligated to submit such facts within the time limitations imposed . . . . The employer was notified of the claimant’s resignation on August 18. It did not furnish this information to the Department until September 10 and has submitted no reasons why the delay should be considered to be with "good cause." "
For example, the claimant worked for the employer on an intermittent part-time basis. The employer had received a DE 1101 in June when the claimant filed a claim. The claimant quit during the last week of July, a week that he was in continued claim status. The employer was not sent another DE 1101 because the claimant did not have excessive earnings. The employer must submit the information concerning the quit within ten days of the occurrence.
This Section discusses the ruling procedure; the process by which an employer is notified of the chargeability or nonchargeability to his or her reserve account for unemployment insurance benefits paid to claimants. Also discussed are the various types of rulings which may be issued in response to specific sets of circumstances. All rulings must comply with the standards established for determination. See FOM Determinations for procedural and timeliness instructions.
Rulings are issued under authority of Sections 1030, 1030.1, 1032, and 1032.5 of the Calif. Unemp. Ins. Code.
Section 1030(c) provides in part:
"The department shall consider such facts [as provided under subsections (a) and (b)] together with any information in its possession. If the employer is entitled to a ruling . . . the department shall promptly notify the employer of its ruling as to the cause of the termination of the claimant’s employment . . . ."
Section 1030(a) applies to "most recent" employers and Section 1030(b) applies to "base period" employers. The "facts" considered by these subsections are whether the claimant:
- Left work voluntarily and without good cause.
- Was discharged for misconduct connected with his or her work.
- Was a student employed on a temporary basis, whose employment began within, and ended with, a leaving to return to school at the end of the vacation period.
- Left work to accompany or join his or her spouse or domestic partner at a place where commuting would be impractical and a transfer by the employer is not available.
- Was discharged from, or quit, the most recent work for reasons that resulted from an irresistible compulsion to use or consume intoxicants.
- Left work voluntarily to protect his or her children, or himself or herself from domestic violence abuse.
The ruling may be favorable or unfavorable. A favorable ruling relieves an employer’s account of any charges for benefits based on the wages paid for the term of employment on which the ruling was made. Nonchargeability of an employer’s account is provided for in Code Section 1032.
Rulings are not issued to employers who:
- Are not subject to paying unemployment insurance taxes in California.
- Have elected reimbursable financing.
- Have not submitted properly completed requests for rulings.
- Have not responded with facts concerning a separation.
See FOM Determinations for procedures on answering these requests.
The Ruling and an Invalid Claim
Wage credits must be available for use to establish an award before the employer may be considered potentially chargeable. No ruling/determination will be issued on an invalid claim because no benefits will be paid and, thus, no charges will be made to the employer’s account. However, if the invalid claim subsequently becomes valid, the ruling provisions of the Code would apply.
The Ruling and the Last Employer:
A Notice of Determination/Ruling is issued to the most recent tax-rated employer if the employer submits timely written information to a UI claim notice pertaining to a quit or discharge.
Section 1327 of the Code provides in part:
"The department shall give a notice of the filing of a new or additional claim to the employing unit by which the claimant was last employed immediately preceding the filing of the claim. The employing unit so notified shall submit . . . any facts then known which may affect the claimant’s eligibility for benefits . . . ."
Section 1030(a) of the Code provides in part:
"Any employer who is entitled under Section 1327 to receive notice of the filing of a new or additional claim may, within 10 days after mailing of such notice, submit to the department any facts within its possession disclosing whether the claimant left such employer’s employ voluntarily and without good cause or was discharged from such employment for misconduct connected with his or her work, or whether the discharge from such employment for misconduct connected with his or her work, or whether the discharge or quit from his or her most recent employer was the result of an irresistible compulsion to use or consume intoxicants including alcoholic beverages, or whether the claimant was a student employed on a temporary basis and whose employment began within, and ended with his or her leaving to return to school at the close of, his or her vacation period, or whether the claimant left such employer’s employ to accompany his or her spouse or domestic partner to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment, to which a transfer of the claimant by the employer is not available, or whether the claimant left the employer’s employ to protect his or her children or himself or herself from domestic violence abuse. ."
The Ruling and the Base Period Employer:
A Notice of Ruling is issued to any base period employer who is not the last employer, if that employer submits timely written information pertaining to a quit or discharge in response to a Notice of Wages Used for Unemployment Insurance (UI) Claims, DE 1545. The DE 1545 is mailed to the base period employer(s) after a week of benefits has been paid.
Section 1329 of the Code provides:
"Upon the filing of a new claim for benefits, the department shall promptly make a computation on the claim which shall set forth the maximum amount of benefits potentially payable during the benefit year, and the weekly benefit amount. The department shall promptly notify the claimant of the computation. The department shall promptly notify each of the claimant’s base period employers of the computation after the payment of the first weekly benefit."
Section 1030(b) of the Code provides in part:
"Any base period employer who is not entitled under Section 1327 to receive notice of the filing of a new or additional claim and is entitled under Section 1329 to receive notice of computation may . . . submit to the department any facts within its possession disclosing whether the claimant left such employer’s employ voluntarily and without good cause or was discharged from such employment for misconduct connected with his or her work, or whether the claimant was a student employed on a temporary basis and whose employment began within, and ended with his or her leaving to return to school at the close of, his or her vacation period, or whether the claimant left such employer’s employ to accompany his or her spouse or domestic partner to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment, to which a transfer of the claimant by the employer is not available, or whether the claimant left the employer’s employ to protect his or her children or himself or herself from domestic violence abuse…."
The Employer Must Respond to the First Notice Received:
The employer is required to respond to the first notice of claim filed under Code Sections 1327 (last employer) and 1331 (base period employer).
Section 1327 provides in part:
"The department shall give a notice of the filing of a new or additional claim to the employing unit by which the claimant was last employed immediately preceding the filing of the claim. . . . The employing unit so notified shall submit within 10 days after the mailing of the notice any facts then known which may affect the claimant’s eligibility for benefits . . . ."
Section 1331 provides in part:
"Any base period employer shall, within 15 days after mailing of a notice of computation, submit to the department any facts then known which he or she was not previously required to submit to the department under Section 1327 which may affect the claimant’s eligibility for benefits."
If the employer does not respond to the first notice issued, but responds to a subsequent notice, the response is considered untimely. A ruling cannot be issued in response to the employer’s protest unless good cause is established for the untimely response.
For example, in P-R-372, the claimant established a benefit year beginning May 13. He was employed from November 13 through December of the same year and then filed an additional claim. The employer responded untimely to the additional claim notice and was denied a ruling/determination. The employer did not appeal. In October of the following year, the claimant filed a second claim. As a base period employer, the employer received a DE 1545. The employer responded timely to this notice with information about the separation in the prior year. The ruling was denied as untimely on the basis that the employer did not respond to the first notice sent. The employer appealed the denial. In its decision, the Board stated:
"[S]ince the employer had neglected its duty as a last employer by having failed to submit disqualifying information within the 10-day period provided by Code Section 1030, its status as a base period employer did not entitle it to a ruling upon receipt of the Notice of Computation of Claim. Based upon that decision, we hold that this employer was not entitled to a ruling since it had failed to submit disqualifying information within 10 days [of the mailing of the first notice]."
B. Special Rulings
- Leaves of Absence and Suspension Rulings
Before a ruling can be issued in connection with the claimant’s last employment, there must be a termination of the employer-employee relationship. A claim filed while the claimant is on a "true" leave of absence or a disciplinary suspension serves to sever the employer-employee relationship for ruling purposes even though the claimant may have every intention of returning to the employer at the end of the leave or suspension.
Such was the finding in Douglas Aircraft Company v. CUIAB et al, a 1960 appellate court decision. The claimant took an unpaid pregnancy leave of absence as required by her collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement specified that a pregnant employee could not remain at work beyond her fourth month of pregnancy and that she had a choice of voluntarily terminating or taking a formal leave of absence. The claimant applied for, and was granted, the leave of absence. She had medical substantiation of her overall healthy condition.
The claimant filed a claim for benefits in August and indicated she was able and willing to work until October. The employer contended the claimant had left voluntarily and without good cause, inasmuch as she was bound by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement to which both she and the employer were parties.
The court held that there was no termination of employment, and that a claimant can ’leave’ his or her most recent work without a termination of the employment relationship. Additionally, the court held that the claimant did not leave her work voluntarily as she had no alternative but to leave when she did; she was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, and the employer was entitled to a ruling since the claimant was no longer working.
Although the Douglas case dealt with a mandatory leave of absence, the same reasoning applies to disciplinary suspensions.
- Student Vacation Employment Rulings
A favorable ruling may be issued to an employer in connection with a student who begins employment during a school vacation period and ends the employment to return to school at the close of the vacation period as indicated by Code Section 1030(a). Under these specific circumstances, the employer will receive a favorable ruling regardless of any decision made in regard to the claimant’s eligibility for benefits.
In P-B-65, the claimant had various periods of employment for his last employer: July 7, 1966 through September 5, 1966, as a temporary helper for vacation relief purposes, and September 6, 1966 through December 2, 1966, as a part-time worker while attending school; June 19, 1967 through September 8, 1967, as a temporary additional warehouseman; October 10, 1967 through November 24, 1967, as a part-time warehouseman while attending school.
On June 17, 1968, the claimant was converted from temporary additional warehouseman to full-time temporary warehouseman for vacation relief purposes. The claimant and the employer both understood that the work would end at the end of the claimant’s school vacation period so he could return to school. In August of that year the claimant asked if he could continue on a part- time basis after school started, but the employer was unable to offer employment after September 17, the day before the claimant returned to school. The claimant signed a separation form stating, in part, that he resigned to return to school as he had done on former occasions. The claimant filed a claim in February of 1969. He reported, "Job terminated" and "I was hired for summer help and the job terminated." In its decision, the Board stated:
"[T]he legislature intended to encourage the hiring of students for vacation work by permitting the non-charging of employer’s reserve accounts for benefits paid based on wages earned while temporarily employed during the vacation period, provided certain conditions were met; namely, that the "employment began with, and ended with his leaving to return to school at the close of, his vacation period. . ." Here the claimant’s full-time employment began within and ended at the close of his vacation period . . . . [W]e find the claimant’s employment "ended with his leaving to return to school at the close of his vacation period." Therefore, the employer’s reserve account is relieved of charges as to benefits paid based on wages earned from that employment . . . ."
- Quit to Accompany or Join Spouse/Imminent Spouse or Registered Domestic Partner Rulings
If it has been determined that the claimant has good cause to voluntarily leave a job for domestic reasons, the employer will be issued an unfavorable ruling except under certain circumstances. Under Calif. Unemp. Code, Sections 1030(a) and (b), an employer who has submitted facts regarding the claimant’s leaving will be issued a favorable ruling if:
"[T]he claimant left the employer’s employ to accompany his or her spouse or domestic partner to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical to commute to the employment, to which a transfer of the claimant by the employer is not available. . . ."
Example: The claimant’s husband found employment which necessitated a move to a new locality. The claimant commuted for a short time but the commute was a difficult, long, and expensive 100 miles each way to work from the new home. She requested a transfer to a plant nearer her home, but there were no openings. Her leaving was with good cause. The employer’s reserve account would not be subject to charges.
A domestic partner must be registered with the California Secretary of State in order for the claimant to have good cause to voluntarily leave his or her job to join his or her domestic partner in a new location where it is too far to commute and a transfer is not available. Refer to Benefit Determination Guide VQ 155 for the definition of a domestic partner as it applies to unemployment insurance benefits.
- Part-Time Employment Rulings
A base period employer may request and receive a favorable part-time employment ruling when the claimant’s employment meets the following criteria:
- Must have been less than fully employed and must not have had excessive earnings (XE) during any week of the employment.
- Must still be working for the employer.
- Must have worked for the same employer continuously since a date beginning either before or during the base period of the claim.
"Continuously" is defined in P-R-122. In this case the claimant worked as a security guard on a part-time intermittent basis either less than 40 hours or not at all. In discussing the use of the word "continuously" in Section 1032.5, the Board cited Jacobsen v. Mutual Health and Accident Association:
". . . The word "continuously" means regularly, protracted, enduring, and without any substantial interruption of sequence, as contra distinguished from irregularly, spasmodically, intermittently, or occasionally, and does not necessarily, mean constantly."
Of the case itself, the Board stated:
"From a review of the record in this matter, it is obvious that the claimant did not render services for the employer on a continuous basis; rather, his services were rendered on an intermittent basis. Therefore, since the claimant was not continuously rendering services on a less than full-time basis, the employer’s reserve account is not entitled to relief of charges under Section 1032.5 of the code."
The interviewer should document the claimant’s employment thoroughly before drawing a conclusion that the employer is entitled to a part-time ruling. The employer should be contacted to determine that the claimant actually was continuously employed (except for short breaks for vacation or illness), and on a less than full-time basis.
Section 1032.5 provides in part:
" (a) Any base period employer may . . . submit to the department facts within its possession disclosing that the individual claiming benefits is rendering services for that employer in less than full-time work, and that the individual has continuously, commencing in or prior to the beginning of the base period, rendered services for that employer in such less than full-time work.
(b) . . . If the department finds that an individual is, under Section 1252, unemployed in any week on the basis of his or her having less than full-time work, and that the employer submitting facts under this section is a base period employer for whom the individual has continuously, commencing in or prior to the beginning of the base period, rendered services in such less than full-time work, that employer’s account shall not be charged . . . for benefits paid the individual in any week in which such wages are payable by that employer to the individual . . . "
- Voluntary Quit for a Substantially Better Job
Under Calif. Unemp. Code, Section 1032, the employer’s reserve account will be relieved of charges if it is determined that the claimant has quit for a better job.
To determine claimant eligibility for benefits see VQ365. Procedures for relieving the employer’s reserve account are in the Determinations FOM 08-05-04.
- Voluntary Quit because of Domestic Violence Abuse
Under Calif. Unemp. Code, Sections 1030 (a), (b), and 1032, an employer’s reserve account may be relieved of charges if it is determined, "the claimant left the employer’s employ to protect his or her children, or himself or herself from domestic violence abuse."
To determine claimant eligibility for benefits see VQ155. Procedures for relieving the employer’s reserve account are in the UI Manual.
C. Prima Facie Cases
A prima facie case is established on facts "at first sight," and which are presumed to be true until disproved by any evidence to the contrary.
In quit "without notice" cases, the presumption that the claimant has quit without good cause is used only for rulings. If any evidence is submitted concerning the reason the claimant quit, the case must be decided based on the weight of evidence. Section 1030(d) of the Code provides in part:
"For purposes of this section only, if the claimant voluntarily leaves such employer’s employ without notification to the employer of the reasons therefor, and if the employer submits all of the facts within its possession concerning such leaving within the applicable time period . . . the leaving shall be presumed to be without good cause."
Example Where Prima Facie Case Established
In P-R-86, the claimant worked Monday through Friday as a production worker. On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, October 16, 17, and 18, the claimant did not report for work nor did he notify his employer of the reason for his absence. The employer had a rule providing for termination for three consecutive days of unreported absence. The Department was unable to secure any information, and although the claimant reported to his employer on Thursday, October 19, it was unknown whether he reported to go to work or to pick up his paycheck. In its decision, the Board stated:
"We believe that the employer has established a prima facie case that the claimant was discharged for violation of Plant Rule No. 6, unreported absence for three consecutive working days, and that the discharge was for misconduct in connection with the work. The burden of going forward with the evidence (i.e., the rebuttability of the presumption) shifted to the Department and it produced no evidence to refute the prima facie case of the employer. . . ."
Example Where Prima Facie Not Established
In P-R-85, the claimant quit work stating that he had received an offer of work from an engineering firm, but did not provide his employer with the name of the engineering firm. Eleven months later the claimant filed a claim, and the employer received a notice as a base period employer. The employer submitted timely information based on the claimant’s statements, and requested the names and addresses of the next two employers. The employer contacted those employers, and found that the wages paid the claimant were substantially lower than the employer had paid. No information was forthcoming from the claimant. The employer contended it had established a prima facie case. In its decision, the Appeals Board cited California Portland Cement v. CUIAB et al, a 1960 appellate court case:
" A prima facie showing requires proof of facts from which a legal conclusion can be drawn. The determination whether an employee left his employment "without good cause" is, in effect, the drawing of a legal conclusion from a set of facts. "Good cause" cannot be determined in the abstract any more than can any other legal conclusion. It can be determined only in relation to a set of facts. . . . In the present case the claimant left work with the appellant because he had "received an offer of work from an engineering firm." Although the evidence showed the claimant did apply for and accept work as a drafting trainee about two months later, . . . it would not be proper to infer that this job was necessarily the job to which the claimant referred when resigned or to infer that the claimant had no work between August . . . and October. . . . The claimant herein definitely indicated that he was leaving work with the appellant to accept an offer of new work with some other employer. . . . It might be argued, inasmuch as no other employment is ascertainable from the Department’s records for this period, that claimant did not have employment during the period. However, the Department’s records covered only California covered employment and do not include federal, intrastate noncovered, and out-of-state employment. Thus, the claimant might have been employed in one of these nonreportable areas. . . . [F]rom the information in the record before us, we must conclude that the appellant has not presented convincing evidence that the claimant voluntarily left its employ without good cause. . . . [T]he employer-appellant has not established any relationship between the leaving of its employ and the subsequently recorded work and has not established the claimant had no intervening work, or was unemployed during the interval. . . . "
D. Required Elements for a Ruling
Title 22, California Code of Regulations, Section 1030(a)-1, provides in part:
" (a) Every request for ruling by an employer under Section 1030(a) of the code shall relate to a single claimant, shall be filed with the field office of the department in which the claim was filed . . . and shall contain the following:
- The name, address, telephone number, and California account number of the employer.
- The claimant’s name and social security account number.
- The effective date of the claim (if available).
- The date of separation from employment.
- Facts relating to the reason for or the circumstances resulting in the claimant’s separation where any of the following is alleged:
- That he or she voluntarily left his or her employment without good cause.
- That he or she was discharged for misconduct connected with his or her work.
- That he or she was a student employed on a temporary basis and whose employment began within, and ended with his or her leaving to return to school at the close of his or her vacation period.
- That he or she left the employer’s employ to accompany his or her spouse, registered domestic partner or a person to whom marriage is imminent at a place from which it is impractical to commute to such employment, to which a transfer of the claimant by the employer is not available.
- That he or she voluntarily left his or her employment without notification to the employer of the reasons therefor.
(b) Each statement of facts submitted under subdivision (a) (5) of this section shall be supported by a statement signed by the person or persons having knowledge of or business records reflecting such facts. "
E. Reconsideration of Rulings
Rulings may be reconsidered, just as the office may reconsider a determination.
Section 1030(c) of the Code provides, in part:
"The department may for good cause reconsider any ruling or reconsidered ruling. . . ."
Reconsideration of rulings must be made within specified time frames. See FOM Determinations.
Generally, the ruling is reconsidered after new facts have been brought to the Department’s attention. However, rulings may also be reconsidered under either of the following specific circumstances:
Rulings Based Upon False Information
Section 1332.5 of the Code provides, in part:
". . . Any provision that prescribes time limits within which the department may reconsider any determination, ruling, or computation or any provision that otherwise restricts or prevents such reconsideration, shall not apply in any case of fraud, misrepresentation or wilful nondisclosure."
Section 1030.1 of the Code provides, in part:
"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, any ruling made prior to a conviction or other final disposition of the criminal complaint or accusation by the court as to whether an individual is terminated due to his absence from work because of incarceration voluntarily leaves without good cause may, if no appeal has been taken from the ruling, for good cause be reconsidered by the department during the benefit year or extended duration period to which the ruling relates. Notice of any reconsidered ruling shall be given to the employer. . . ."